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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the incentive mechanism design for
real-time data aggregation, which holds a large spectrum
of crowdsensing applications. Despite extensive studies on
static incentive mechanisms, none of these are applicable to
real-time data aggregation due to their incapability of main-
taining PUs’ long-term participation. We emphasize that, to
maintain PUs’ long-term participation, it is of significant im-
portance to protect their privacy as well as to provide them a
desirable cumulative compensation. Thus motivated, in this
paper, we propose LEPA, an efficient incentive mechanism
to stimulate long-term participation in real-time data aggre-
gation. Specifically, we allow PUs to preserve their privacy
by reporting noisy data, the impact of which on the aggrega-
tion accuracy is quantified with proper privacy and accuracy
measures. Then, we provide a framework that jointly opti-
mizes the incentive schemes in different time slots to ensure
desirable cumulative compensation for PUs and thereby pre-
vent PUs from leaving the system halfway. Considering PUs’
strategic behaviors and combinatorial nature of the sensing
tasks, we propose a computationally efficient on-line auc-
tion with close-to-optimal performance in presence of NP-
hardness of winner user selection. We further show that
the proposed on-line auction satisfies desirable properties of
truthfulness and individual rationality. The performance of
LEPA is validated by both theoretical analysis and extensive
simulations.
Keywords
Crowd sensing, data aggregation, privacy preservation, in-
centive mechanism
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The pervasive use of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones,
smartwatchs, and tablet computers, etc.) embedded with
multiple sensors (e.g., GPS, gyroscope and microphone, etc.)
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has given rise to a new sensing paradigm known as crowd-
sensing [1–3]. Due to its low deployment cost and high
sensing coverage, crowdsensing has spurred a wide range of
applications including smart transportation, environmental
monitoring and spectrum sensing, etc [4–6].
Real-time data aggregation holds a wild spectrum of crowd-
sensing applications, where Fusion Center (FC) continuously
collects sensing data from Participatory Users (PUs) to pro-
vide real-time services. For instance, Waze [7], a naviga-
tion app on smartphones that utilizes Waze users’ (PUs)
reported traffic data to estimate the real-time traffic condi-
tion. As shown in Figure 1, Waze users continuously report
their speed and location information, as well as real-time
traffic jams or accidents to Waze server (FC) through Waze
app. Based on the information collected, the Waze server
can carry out data aggregation and data analysis to provide
real-time traffic information.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the Waze crowdsensing system.
Clearly, participating in real-time data aggregation is costly
for PUs, since it consumes not only PUs’ time but also the
system resources (e.g., computing and communication en-
ergy) in mobile devices. It is essential to design incentive
mechanisms to stimulate PUs’ participation. In real-time
data aggregation, PUs may drop out of the system halfway
(e.g., close the account or even uninstall the crowdsensing
app) if their long-term cumulative compensation expecta-
tions are not fulfilled, leading to insufficient number of PUs
that continuously provide high quality services. Thus, we
emphasize that the incentive mechanism design for real-time
data aggregation needs to take a global perspective, guar-
anteeing that each PU has a desirable cumulative compen-
sation and thus maintaining their long-term participation.
This is quite different from previous studies on static incen-
tive mechanism design, which encourages PUs to participate
in one-time sensing tasks.
To maintain PUs’ long-term participation, there are two
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main concerns. On one hand, when contributing their sens-
ing data, PUs suffer from potential privacy losses (e.g., the
sensing data collected by the Waze server involves locational
information), which hinders them from long-term partici-
pation. To dispel PUs’ misgivings about potential privacy
losses, an incentive mechanism should be well designed to al-
low PUs to fully control their own data privacy, and to pro-
vide adequate compensations for their privacy losses. On
the other hand, participating in crowdsensing always in-
curs some indirect costs besides directly contributing sensing
data. For example, when running in background, the crowd-
sensing app still consumes computation and bandwidth re-
sources, even if the PU is not selected as a data contributor.
However, the objective of the extensively studied static in-
centive mechanisms [8–15] is to select a subset of PUs that
maximize FC’s current utility to carry out the sensing tasks,
possibly rendering some PUs being unselected for a long pe-
riod. Clearly, if a PU is rarely selected as a contributor in a
long time, her cumulative cost can not be well compensated
and loses interest in participation. Resultantly, incentive
schemes in different time slots should be jointly optimized
to maintain PUs’ long-term participation.
In this paper, to resolve the above two concerns, we first
allow PUs to preserve their data privacy by adding well-
calibrated noise to their raw sensing data before report-
ing them. Such an approach bears two distinct merits: (i)
PUs can fully control their private data; (ii) PUs’ privacy-
preserving levels (PPLs) can be quantified by the celebrated
notion of differential privacy. Then, we provide a framework
that jointly optimizes the incentive schemes in different slots
to maintain PUs’ long-term participation. Specifically, we
take an auction approach and propose LEPA1, a novel incen-
tive mechanism that maintains PUs’ long-term participation
in real-time data aggregation.
There are three major challenges in designing LEPA. Firstly,
adding noise will inevitably impair the aggregation accu-
racy of FC. To achieve desirable aggregation accuracy in a
cost-efficient manner, it is essential to quantify PUs’ PPLs
on FC’s aggregation accuracy, which requires the calcula-
tion of the integral of the cumulative noises. This is dif-
ficult because for the mechanisms that achieve differential
privacy, either the summation of n Laplacian variables is a
complex non-integrable distribution (i.e., Laplacian mecha-
nism) or the probability density function of Gaussian dis-
tribution is non-integrable (i.e., Gaussian mechanism). Sec-
ondly, to maintain PUs’ long-term participation, it is es-
sential to guarantee that each PU will be selected at least
once in several rounds, i.e., each PU’s selected probability
should be no less than a certain threshold. However, the
calculation of such a selected probability depends on not
only the past and current user selection strategies, but also
future user selection strategies. This renders user selection
strategies interrelated cross time domain, making the long-
term incentive mechanism design more challenging. Thirdly,
through adopting auction approach, FC selects PUs based
on their biddings, which is determined by their sensing cost
and privacy cost. Strategic PUs may misreport their bid-
dings to maximize their own benefits, leading to high costs
of achieving a desirable aggregation accuracy. It is chal-
lenging to devise a truthful incentive mechanism when PUs
behave strategically.
1The name LEPA comes from Long-tErm Privacy-
preserving data Aggregation
1.2 Summary of Main Contributions
In this paper, we quantify the impact of PUs’ PPLs on
FC’s aggregation accuracy with proper privacy and accuracy
measures, and propose an on-line incentive mechanism to
deal with the strategy coupling issue incurred by the long-
term participation requirements. The contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows:
• Our work takes the first attempt to systematically
study the long-term incentive mechanism for privacy-
preserving data aggregation.
• We allow PUs to add well-calibrated noise to their raw
sensing data before reporting them. By creatively us-
ing tail bound theory, we successfully bypass the direct
calculation of integrals of non-integrable distributions,
and derive the quantitative impact of PUs’ PPLs on
FC’s aggregation accuracy.
• An on-line framework is proposed to deal with the
strategy coupling issue by transforming the long-term
participation requirement to a queue stability prob-
lem. Specifically, for each PU, we construct a virtual
sensing request queue with a constant input rate, and
its output rate is proportional to the PU’s selected
rate. To meet the long-term participation requirement
is equivalent to ensuring the stability of all the virtual
sensing request queues. We then jointly optimize FC’s
total payment and the queue length.
• Considering PUs’ strategic behaviors and the combina-
torial nature of the tasks, we design an incentive mech-
anism based on reverse combinatorial auction, where
FC acts as an auctioneer and purchases private sensing
data from PUs. Due to the NP-hardness of the com-
binatorial auction, we propose a computationally ef-
ficient mechanism with close-to-optimal performance,
meanwhile guaranteeing individual rationality and truth-
fulness.
• Both theoretical analysis and extensive simulations are
conducted to corroborate the performance of the pro-
posed incentive mechanism.
1.3 Organization of This Paper
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss the related work. We introduce the
problem formulation in Section 3 and provide the design de-
tails of LEPA in Section 4. Section 5 provides theoretical
analysis to LEPA, and Section 6 conducts extensive sim-
ulations to illustrate the effectiveness of LEPA. Section 7
concludes this paper.
2. RELATEDWORK
Game theory has been widely adopted to capture PUs’
strategic behaviors for incentive mechanism design in the
crowdsensing system. These incentive mechanisms are based
on either auction [8–11] or other game-theoretical models
[12–15]. Most of the previous studies consider static in-
centive, which encourages PUs to participate in one-time
sensing tasks. These works are inapplicable to the real-time
crowdsensing applications. Recently, a few incentive mecha-
nisms have been proposed to stimulate PUs’ long-term par-
ticipation. In [16], Lee et al. proposed to provide virtual
credit to PUs who lost in the previous auction round, so that
their winning probabilities increase in the future rounds.
Gao et al. in [17] proposed a long-term sensor selection
mechanism for a general location-aware crowdsensing sys-
tem. However, both of them study an abstract and general
crowdsensing system without addressing PUs’ privacy con-
cern. Further, they fail to provide a truthful mechanism
with proofed performance guarantee.
Another line of related works view privacy as a good and
aim to compensate PUs’ privacy losses. In their seminal
work [18], Ghosh et al. designed an auction mechanism to
maximize FC’s utility subject to a budget constraint. There-
after, several improved mechanisms have been proposed,
especially considering the correlation between the privacy
preference and the private data. Nevertheless, the existing
works either deprived PUs’ direct control on their data pri-
vacy (since FC is assumed to be trustworthy and responsible
for protecting their privacy) [8,19–21], or focus on PUs’ equi-
librium behavior [22], which may end up with an inefficient
equilibrium, i.e., FC may not achieve a desirable aggregation
accuracy in a cost-efficient manner.
Different from the existing works on abstract crowdsens-
ing tasks, our study investigates a kind of widely deployed
crowdsensing tasks, i.e., real-time data aggregation. We
proposed a novel paradigm that allows PUs to add well-
calibrated noise to their raw sensing data before report-
ing them, enabling PUs’ fully control of their data privacy.
Then, rather than incentivize PUs’ one-time participation,
our incentive mechanism can jointly optimize FC’s total pay-
ment and PUs’ long-term participation requirements, mean-
while satisfies proofed truthfulness and near-to-optimal per-
formance.
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the system overview, as well
as descriptions to the quantitative impact of PUs’ PPLs on
FC’s aggregation accuracy, auction model and design objec-
tives.
3.1 System overview
The crowdsensing system considered in this paper con-
sists of an FC and a set U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} of n PUs, as
illustrated in Figure 2. FC has a task pool which possesses
a set T = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk} of k sensing tasks. The sensing
tasks request data slot by slot, where each time slot ranges
from several minutes to several hours, depending on the up-
dating frequency requirements of the sensing tasks. At time
slot t, each PU can execute a subset of tasks in the task
pool based on the capability of her mobile device and her
current location. Let yij(t) ∈ {0, 1} denote whether PU i
can execute task j, and yi(t) denote PU i’s capability vector
in time slot t. For each task τj , FC should collect plenty
of sensing data from PUs and carry out some aggregation
operations, such as average or histogram, to abstract some
valuable patterns. For easy exposition, in this paper, we
will investigate the average aggregation2, which constitute
a large portion of currently deployed crowdsensing systems,
such as traffic monitoring systems that leverage vehicular
PUs’ GPS data to estimate average traffic speed of a spe-
cific road. Then FC can select a subset of PUs to implement
2We leave the discussion of other kinds of data aggregations
in future work.
all sensing tasks. We denote whether PU i is selected in time
slot t as xi(t) ∈ {0, 1}.
Clearly, the sensing data usually contain sensitive infor-
mation about PUs, which will hinder them from providing
their raw sensing data. Different from most of the previ-
ous studies on privacy-preserving data aggregation, we do
not assume FC to be trustworthy since it maybe compro-
mised or the communication channel maybe eavesdropped.
Making a paradigm shift, we remove the trustworthy FC
assumption and allow PUs to add well-calibrated noises to
their raw sensing data before reporting them. Specifically,
the workflow of the proposed crowdsensing system is as fol-
lows.
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Figure 2: A framework of the proposed crowdsensing
system. The circled numbers stand for procedures of the
system operation.
• Firstly, at time slot t, each task launches a sensing re-
quest, and specifies its aggregation accuracy require-
ment to the incentive mechanism (step ¬).
• Incentive mechanism: Upon receiving the sensing
requests, FC conducts a reverse combinatorial auction
to purchase PUs’ private sensing data. Specifically,
FC first broadcasts all sensing requests and specifies a
homogeneous PPL to PUs (step ­). Then, PU i sub-
mits a bidding bi(t) = {Γi(t), bsi (t), bpi (t)} to FC, where
Γi(t) is the set representation of yi(t)
3, bsi (t) and b
p
i (t)
are the sensing cost and unit privacy cost of PU i at
time slot t (step ®). Finally, FC selects an optimal
set of winners S = {u1, u2, . . . , ul} (step ¯) that could
implement all sensing tasks, and provides them corre-
sponding payments P = {p1, p2, . . . , pl} (step °).
• Data aggregation: Each selected PU adds a well-
calibrated noise to her raw sensing data, i.e., d˜i =
di + ηi, and uploads the perturbed sensing data d˜i to
FC (step ±). FC then carries out data aggregation for
each task.
• Finally, the aggregation results are leveraged to update
the estimation of sensing tasks (step ²).
Remark In practice, once the auction is finished, the crowd-
sensing apps of winner PUs will collect the sensing data and
add the specified levels of noise before reporting them to FC
automatically, such that PUs can not cheat on their noise
3We will use Γi(t) and yi(t) interchangeably as convenient
in the following parts.
distribution, as well as the corresponding noise level, e.g.,
adding higher noise level to better preserve privacy.
3.2 Privacy versus Accuracy
Intuitively, adding noise will inevitably deteriorate FC’s
aggregation accuracy. In order to provide accurate incen-
tive in presence of noisy data, it is essential to quantify the
impact of the noise level, i.e., PUs’ PPLs, on FC’s aggrega-
tion accuracy with proper privacy and accuracy definition.
We adopt the celebrated notion of differential privacy [23],
which has rigorous mathematical definition and is indepen-
dent of attackers’ background knowledge, to define PUs’ pri-
vacy. Intuitively, differential privacy guarantees that the
attackers can not distinguish between the neighboring in-
puts with high confidence given a randomized output. Tra-
ditional differential privacy assumes a trustworthy curator
which is not applicable to our system. In this paper, we con-
cern about local differential privacy where PUs add noises
to their raw data locally.
Defining local differential privacy requires the following
adjacency definition:
Definition 1 (ζi-adjacency). Two real numbers d and d
′
are ζi-adjacency if |d− d′| ≤ ζi, where ζi is the length of the
value range of d.
Based on the above adjacency definition, we define the
local differential privacy as follows:
Definition 2 (i-local differential privacy). A random al-
gorithm {A : R → R|A(di) = di + ηi} achieves i-local
differential privacy, if for all pairs of ζi-adjacency data di
and d′i, and observation d
obs,
Pr[A(di) = dobs] ≤ eiPr[A(d′i) = dobs].
Intuitively, smaller i means higher PPL, since it is more
difficult to distinguish di from d
′
i given the observation d
obs.
We then adopt the widely used Laplacian mechanism to
achieve local differential privacy. It is known in [24] that,
when the Laplacian mechanism is used, i.e., ηi ∼ Lap(0, ai),
we can achieve i-local differential privacy if ai =
ζi
i
.
Then, we define the aggregation accuracy in Definition 3.
Definition 3 ((α, δ)-accuracy). The aggregation sˆ of privacy-
preserving sensing data is said to achieve (α, δ)-accuracy if
Pr[|s− sˆ| ≥ α] ≤ δ.
From statistical perspective, α is the confidence interval
of the aggregation error and δ is the confidence level.
With the privacy and accuracy definitions, we derive the
quantitative impact of PUs’ PPLs on FC’s aggregation ac-
curacy in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In time slot t, task τj achieves (αj , δj)-accuracy
if ∑
i:ui∈U
xi(t)yij(t)
ζ
2i (t)( ∑
i:ui∈U
xi(t)yij(t)
)2 ≤ α2j (t)δj(t)2 , (1)
where ζ is the range of all PUs’ sensing data.
The proof can be found in Appendix A. In this paper, we
consider the scenario where FC broadcasts a homogeneous
PPL  to all PUs4, i.e., all PUs share the same . To simplify
the analysis, we transform (1) to∑
i:ui∈U
xi(t)yij(t) ≥ 2ζ
2α2j (t)δj(t)
.
We denote rj(t) =
2ζ
2α2j (t)δj(t)
as task τj ’s aggregation ac-
curacy requirement, and leverage a vector r(t)
= (r1(t), · · · , rm(t)) to denote the accuracy requirements of
all tasks.
3.3 Auction Model
In this paper, we investigate the long-term incentive mech-
anism for privacy-preserving data aggregation, where tasks
require real-time sensing data from PUs. We assume that
PUs are all selfish and strategic, aiming to maximize their
own utility. Thus, we model our incentive mechanism as the
Long-term Privacy-preserving Reverse Combinatorial (LPRC)
auction.
Definition 4 (LPRC Auction). In a long-term privacy-
preserving reverse combinatorial auction, each PU ui is in-
terested in a subset of tasks in time slot t, i.e., yi(t), and
can bid her sensing cost bsi (t) and unit privacy cost b
p
i (t)
for reporting the sensing data. Both bsi (t) and b
p
i (t) are ui’s
private information.
Then, we define PU’s utility and FC’s payment in Defini-
tion 5 and Definition 6.
Definition 5 (PU’s Utility). The utility of PU i is given by
Ui(t) =
{
pi(t)− csi (t)− cpi (t), i ∈ S,
0, otherwise,
Definition 6 (FC’s Payment). In time slot t, FC’s total
payment P (t) is given by
P (t) =
∑
i:ui∈S
pi(t)
3.4 Design Objective
Since PUs are strategic and their sensing costs as well
as privacy costs are unknown to FC, they may misreport
their truthful biddings to achieve higher profits. For exam-
ple, a selfish PU may report a higher sensing cost to achieve
more compensation. Therefore, we should guarantee that
our LPRC auction satisfies the following truthfulness objec-
tives.
Definition 7 (Truthfulness). A LPRC auction satisfies truth-
fulness if and only if submitting the truthful bidding bi =
(Γi, c
s
i , c
p
i ) is the dominant strategy for all PUs, i.e., Ui(bi, b−i)
≥ Ui(b′i, b−i), ∀b′i 6= bi.
Truthfulness guarantees that submitting the truthful bid-
ding can maximize each PU’s utility, so that all PUs have
no incentives to misreport their biddings. Apart from truth-
fulness, our mechanism should also satisfies individual ratio-
nality, i.e., each PU’s utility is non-negative so that all PUs
are willing to participate.
Definition 8 (Individual Rationality). A LPRC auction
satisfies individual rationality if and only if Ui ≥ 0 for all
ui ∈ U .
4The selection principle of  will be discussed in the simula-
tion part.
For the real-time data aggregation tasks, PUs suffer from
some indirect cost when running crowdsensing app in back-
ground. If a PU is rarely selected for a long time, she will
probably choose to leave the platform. To maintain PUs’
activity, we should guarantee that the probability that each
PU being selected is no less than the minimum selected prob-
ability requirement D. Formally, we define this requirement
as the long-term participation constraint in Definition 9.
Definition 9 (Long-term Participation). A LPRC auction
satisfies long-term participation constraints if and only if
ui’s selected probability satisfies
1
T
∑
t∈T
xi(t) ≥ D, ∀ui ∈ U .
In practice, we can conduct questionnaires to determine
the minimum threshold D that maintains PUs’ long-term
participation.
4. LONG-TERM INCENTIVEMECHANISM
In this section, we first provide the design details on LEPA,
including mathematical formulation, on-line auction trans-
formation and on-line auction design. Then, we discuss some
practical issues in implementing LEPA.
4.1 Mathematical Formulation
As aforementioned, LEPA is based on the LPRC auction
defined in Definition 4. In this paper, we aim to design an
LPRC auction that minimizes FC’s long-term total payment
while guaranteeing the aggregation accuracy requirements
of all sensing tasks. Therefore, in each time slot, FC deter-
mines the winner PUs and the corresponding payments by
solving the following LPRC long-term total payment mini-
mization (LPRC-LTPM) problem.
LPRC-LTPM Problem.
min
∑
t∈T
∑
i:ui∈U
pi(t)xi(t) (2)
s.t.
1
T
∑
t∈T
xi(t) ≥ D, ∀ui ∈ U , (3)
∑
i:ui∈U
xi(t)yij(t) ≥ rj(t), ∀τj ∈ T , (4)
xi(t) ∈ {0, 1}, pi(t) ∈ [0,+∞], (5)
Constants: In each time slot, the LPRC-LTPM problem
takes as input the task set T , PU set U , accuracy require-
ments vector r(t), bidding profile (yi(t), b
s
i (t), b
p
i (t)), ∀ui ∈
U , as well as the minimum selected probability requirement
D.
Variables: The LPRC-LTPM problem has a vector of
n binary variables x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xn(t)). Any
xi(t) = 1 indicates that ui is selected in time slot t (i.e.,
ui ∈ S), whereas xi(t) = 0 means ui 6∈ S. Another vector of
n variables p(t) = (p1(t), p2(t), · · · , pn(t)) is the payment
profile where pi(t) takes non-negative real value. If ui 6∈ S
in time slot t, pi(t) = 0.
Objective function: The objective function is set as the
long-term total payment.
Constraints: Constraint (3) is the long-term participa-
tion constraint as defined in Definition 9. Constraint (4)
guarantees that each task τj ’s accuracy requirement is sat-
isfied. In addition, any solution to LPRC-LTPM problem
should satisfy two inherent constraints, i.e., truthfulness and
individual rationality.
Notice that constraint (3) is a time average constraint,
where current strategy is coupled with future strategies.
However, PUs’ biddings in the future are unknown, making
the user selection in current time slot challenging. To tackle
such a challenge, we transform the LPRC-LTPM problem
to an on-line auction design problem.
4.2 On-line Auction Transformation
The main idea of the on-line auction is to transform the
long-term participation requirements to the queue stability
requirements, and leverage Lyapunov optimization theorem
[25] to jointly optimize the queue stability and FC’s total
payment. Following this idea, we first construct a virtual
request queue with arrival rate D for each PU to buffer her
sensing request. Clearly, the backlog of a virtual request
queue corresponds to the cumulative sensing requests of each
PU. Then, if ui is selected at time slot t, i.e., xi(t) = 1, one
virtual request leaves the backlog.
Based on the above virtual request queue definition, we
have the following queue dynamics:
qi(t+ 1) = [qi(t)− xi(t)]+ +D,
where qi(t) denotes the virtual request queue backlog of ui
at time slot t, and [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
We can analyze the queue stability by the Lyapunov drift,
which is defined as the difference between the Lyapunov
functions in two adjacent time slots. Normally, the Lya-
punov function is defined as quadratic sum of all queue back-
logs, i.e.,
L(t) , 1
2
∑
i:ui∈U
(qi(t))
2.
Thus, the Lyapunov drift is given by
∆(t) , L(t+ 1)− L(t).
The Lyapunov drift theorem indicates that an algorithm
greedily minimizing ∆(t) in each time slot guarantees the
stabilities of all queues. Once all virtual request queues are
stabilized, the long-term participation requirements are au-
tomatically satisfied.
Recall that the objective of LPRC-LTPM problem is to
minimize FC’s total payment meanwhile satisfying all long-
term participation constraints, i.e., stabilizing all the virtual
request queues. By the Lyapunov optimization theorem,
we can minimize the following drift-plus-penalty to jointly
stabilize the queues and optimize the objection function.
∆(t) + γ
∑
i:ui∈U
pi(t)xi(t),
where γ is a tuning parameter used to achieve the desirable
tradeoff between queue stability and objective optimality.
Notice that ∆(t) is a quadratic function which is difficult
to handle in the optimization problem. Thus, we focus on
minimizing a specific linear upper bound of the drift-plus-
penalty given by
∆(t) =L(t+ 1)− L(t) (6)
=
1
2
 ∑
i:ui∈U
([qi(t)− xi(t)]+ +D)2 −
∑
i:ui∈U
qi(t)
2
 (7)
≤1
2
( ∑
i:ui∈U
(
qi(t)
2 +D2 + xi(t)
2 + 2qi(t)(D − xi(t))
)
(8)
−
∑
i:ui∈U
qi(t)
2
)
(9)
≤
∑
i:ui∈U
D2 + 1
2
+
∑
i:ui∈U
qi(t)D −
∑
i:ui∈U
qi(t)xi(t), (10)
where the first inequality holds since (max[q−x, 0]+D)2 ≤
q2 + D2 + x2 + 2q(D − x), and the second inequality holds
because xi(t) ∈ {0, 1}.
Notice that the first two parts of (10) are constants. Min-
imizing (10) is equivalent to minimizing∑
i:ui∈U
−qi(t)xi(t)). Therefore, we can transform the LPRC-
LTPM problem to the following LPRC on-line total payment
minimization (LPRC-OTPM) problem:
LPRC-OTPM Problem.
min
∑
i:ui∈U
[γpi(t)− qi(t)]xi(t)
s.t.
∑
i:ui∈U
xi(t)yij(t) ≥ rj(t), ∀τj ∈ T
xi(t) ∈ {0, 1}, pi(t) ∈ [0,+∞],
It is easy to show that the LPRC-OTPM problem is poly-
nomial time reducible to the minimum weight set cover prob-
lem, meaning the LPRC-OTPM problem is NP-hard. It fol-
lows directly that calculating the optimal winner PUs and
the corresponding payments profile are computationally in-
efficient when the number of PUs and tasks become large.
To tackle such a problem, we present an on-line LPRC auc-
tion with near-to-optimal performance in the following sub-
section.
4.3 On-line LPRC Auction Design
Algorithm 1: On-line LPRC Auction Design
Input: , b, r, γ, U , T ;
Output: S, p;
1 Initialization: q = {0, · · · , 0};
2 foreach time slot t = 0, 1, · · · , T do
3 Selection Rule:
4 run Algorithm 2 and output the winner user
set S;
5 Payment Rule:
6 run Algorithm 3 and output the payment
profile p;
7 Updating Rule:
8 qi(t+ 1) = [qi(t)− xi(t)]+ +Dn;
9 end
We illustrate the on-line LPRC auction in Algorithm 1.
Notice that the on-line LPRC auction focus on user selec-
tion and payment determination strategy in time slot t. For
ease of exposition, we remove the time index t for related
variables, e.g., we simplify the payment profile p(t) to p. In
the beginning of each time slot, the on-line LPRC auction
runs Algorithms 2 and 3 to determine the winner user set
S and the corresponding payment profile p. Then, updat-
ing each ui’s virtual request queue as line 7. We depict the
winner user selection algorithm and payment determination
algorithm in the following parts.
Algorithm 2: Winner User Selection
Input: , b, r, γ, q, U , T ;
Output: S;
1 Initialization: S ← ∅; r’← r;
2 while
∑
j:τj∈T r
′
j 6= 0 do
// Select the PU with minimum bidding accuracy ratio.
3 l = arg mini∈U
bsi+b
p
i −
qi
γ∑
j:τj∈Γi min{r
′
j ,1}
;
4 S ← S ∪ {ul};
5 U ← U \ {ul};
// Update r′j
6 foreach j : τj ∈ Γl do
7 r′j ← r′j −min{r′j , 1};
8 end
9 end
10 return S;
The winner user selection algorithm given in Algorithm 2
takes as input the PPL , bidding profile b (including each
ui’s cost c
s
i , c
p
i and capability vector yi), accuracy require-
ment vector r, tuning parameter γ, queue vector q, the PU
set U and the task set T . Firstly, we initialize the winner
user set S (line 1). Then, in each loop, the PU with min-
imum bidding accuracy ratio is selected until all tasks’ ac-
curacy requirements are satisfied, i.e.,
∑
j:τj∈T rj = 0. The
bidding accuracy ratio is defined in line 3, meaning each
PU’s contribution to the optimization problem. Finally, in
the end of each loop, the remaining accuracy requirement of
each task is updated (line 7).
Algorithm 3: Payment Determination
Input: , b, r, γ, q, U , T , S;
Output: p
1 Initialization: p← (0, · · · , 0);
2 foreach i : ui ∈ S do
3 run Algorithm 2 on U \ {ui};
4 S ′ ← the winner set of step 3;
// Calculate payment
5 foreach k : uk ∈ S ′ do
6 r′j ← task τj ’s r′j when uk was selected;
7 pi ← max{pi,
∑
j:τj∈Γi
min{r′j ,1}∑
j:τj∈Γk
min{r′j ,1}
(bsk+b
p
k− qkγ )+ qiγ };
8 end
9 end
10 return p
Next, we decide the payments to the winner PUs by Al-
gorithm 3. The payment determination algorithm takes as
input all the input parameters of Algorithm 2, as well as
the winner user set S returned by Algorithm 2. Firstly, we
initialize the payment vector p. Then, for each winner user
ui, run Algorithm 2 on the set of users except ui. We de-
note the winner user set in this case as S ′ (line 3-4). Finally,
each winner user ui is paid by the maximum virtual bidding
price bvik that makes her replacing uk ∈ S ′ as the winner
(line 5-7). To achieve this, we should guarantee that
bvik − qiγ∑
j:τj∈Γi min{r′j , 1}
=
bsk + b
p
k− qkγ∑
j:τj∈Γk min{r′k, 1}
Therefore
bvik = max
pi,
∑
j:τj∈Γi
min{r′j , 1}∑
j:τj∈Γk
min{r′j , 1}
(bsk + b
p
k−
qk
γ
) +
qi
γ

4.4 Discussions on Practical Implementation
We emphasize that the fundamental objective of LEPA
is not to maintain all registered users of the crowdsensing
system active in the system, since some of them are unable
to execute any sensing tasks in some circumstance, e.g., in
the Waze application, some registered users go home and can
no longer provide real-time traffic information. Our focus
is that, once a registered user arrives at the crowdsensing
system (and thus becomes a PU), we do not want she leaves
the system for the reason that her expectation is not fulfilled
(e.g., her privacy is breached or she is rarely selected).
In practice, our framework is easily adapted to deal with
the situation where the registered users arbitrarily arrive at
and leave the crowdsensing system. Specifically, when a reg-
istered user arrives at the crowdsensing system, we establish
a virtual request queue for this user, and empty the queue
when this user leaves. The update of the virtual request
queues are the same to Algorithm 1, and the winner user
selection and payment determination in each time slot are
the same to Algorithms 2 and 3. Further, our framework is
also suitable to deal with the situation where the updating
frequency requirements of the tasks in the task pool are het-
erogeneous. Tasks in the task pool can request for updating
any time base on their updating frequency requirements. In
each time slot, we should only satisfy that the aggregation
accuracy requirements of the tasks that request for updat-
ing (rather than all tasks in the task pool) are satisfied. The
on-line auction design is the same to Algorithm 1.
5. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide theoretical analysis to the pro-
posed on-line LPRC auction, including truthfulness, indi-
vidual rationality, computational complexity and approxi-
mation bound.
We prove the truthfulness of the proposed mechanism by
the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. An auction is truthful if and only if the following
two properties hold [10].
• Monotonicity: if ui wins the auction by biding bi and
yi, she also wins by biding b
′
i ≤ bi and Γ′i ⊃ Γi when
other PUs’ biddings are fixed.
• Critical payment: PU who wins the auction is paid
the maximum bidding price b′i such that bids (Γi, b
′
i)
still keeps this PU win. The maximum bidding price b′i
is called critical payment.
Theorem 3 (Truthfulness). The proposed on-line LPRC
auction satisfies truthfulness property.
Proof. We prove the truthfulness of the proposed on-line
LPRC auction by showing that it satisfies both monotonicity
property and critical payment property.
• Monotonicity: We select the winner users in the as-
cending order of their bidding accuracy ratio. Given a
fixed , it is obvious that ui still wins by biding Γ˜i ⊃ Γi
and b˜si + b˜
p
i  ≤ bsi + bpi .
• Critical payment: According to the price determi-
nation algorithm proposed in Algorithm 3, the winning
PU is paid by the maximum bidding price bvik.
Notice that, the PU may bid bsi 6= csi and bpi 6= cpi while
bsi + b
p
i  = c
s
i + c
p
i . But this will not increase her payment.
Thus, they will still have incentive to bid truthfully.
Theorem 4 (Individual rationality). The proposed on-line
LPRC auction satisfies individual rationality property.
Proof. For PUs that lose the auction, the utilities are zero
according to Definition 5. For the winning PUs, they bid
the true value (csi , c
p
i ) and are paid exactly the maximum
bidding prices that still keep them win, guaranteeing that
pi ≥ csi + cpi . Thus, ui ≥ 0, ∀ui ∈ U , meaning the proposed
on-line LPRC auction satisfies individual rationality.
Theorem 5 (Computational complexity). The computa-
tional complexity of the proposed on-line LPRC auction is
O(N3 +N2M).
Proof. Algorithm 2 terminates afterN iterations in the worst
case. In each iteration, the computation complexity of the
winner selection and accuracy requirements update areO(N)
and O(M), respectively. Therefore, the computation com-
plexity of Algorithm 2 is O(N2 +NM). Furthermore, Algo-
rithm 3 have N iterations of outer loop beside Algorithm 3.
Thus, the computation complexity of the proposed on-line
LPRC auction is O(N3 +N2M)
Then, we analyze the approximation bound of the pro-
posed on-line LPRC auction. Notice that the objective func-
tion of the LPRC-OTPM problem comprises of two kinds of
variables, i.e., binary variable x(t) and continuous variable
p(t), making the analysis of the approximation bound dif-
ficult. Further, the optimal solution to the LPRC-OTPM
problem is not nonnegative so that it is impractical to achieve
a multiplicative approximation bound. To tackle the above
challenges, we construct the following LPRC on-line total
cost minimization (LPRC-OTCM) problem.
LPRC-OTCM Problem.
min
∑
i:ui∈U
[csi + c
p
i −
qi
γ
+m]xi
s.t.
∑
i:ui∈U
yijxi ≥ rj , ∀τj ∈ T
xi ∈ {0, 1},
where m = max
i:ui∈U
qi
γ
.
Notice that the objective function of the LPRC-OTCM
problem contains only the binary variables x(t) and the op-
timal solution is non-negative. It is easy to come up with
a multiplicative bound to the LPRC-OTCM problem. De-
note the optimal solution to LPRC-OTCM problem as M∗,
θ = maxi,j:ui∈U,τj∈T yij |Γi| and d = 1∆r
∑
j∈T
rj , where ∆r is
the unit measure of elements in rj . According to [10], we
have ∑
i∈S
(csi + c
p
i −
qi
γ
+m) ≤ 2θHdM∗
where Hd = 1 +
1
2
+ · · ·+ 1
d
.
Then, we derive the relationship between the optimal so-
lution M∗ and P ∗ of the LPRC-OTCM problem and the
LPRC-OTPM problem in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. The relationship between M∗ and P ∗ is given
by
M∗ ≤ P ∗ +mn.
where n is the total number of PUs.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Define δ = (max
i∈U
(bski+
bpki−
qki
γ
)/(min
i∈U
(bski + b
p
ki
− qki
γ
+m)). The approximation
bound of the proposed on-line LPRC auction is given by
Theorem 7.
Theorem 7 (Approximation Bound). The approximation
bound of the proposed on-line LPRC auction is given by
P ≤ 2δθdHd(P ∗ +mn)
where P is the solution achieved by the proposed on-line
LPRC auction. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first introduce two baselines and the
simulation settings. Then, we present the simulation results.
6.1 Simulation Setup
Firstly, we introduce two baselines to illustrate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed on-line LPRC auction. The first
baseline is static auction without long-term participation
constraints, FC only aim to minimize its total payment at
current slot. In the static auction, FC chooses the winner
users by their accuracy bidding ratio and pay them with
their critical payments at each time slot. The other base-
line is an LPRC auction with compulsory long-term par-
ticipation constraints, i.e., compulsory LPRC auction. The
compulsory LPRC auction chooses winner users by their ac-
curacy bidding ratio meanwhile guarantees that all PUs will
be selected at least once every 1
D
time slots (we set D = 0.2
in the following simulations). The winner users are paid
their critical payments.
Then, we provide the simulation settings in Table 1. In
setting I, II and III, τj ’s accuracy requirement αj , δj and
ui’s cost c
s
i , c
p
i take values from the interval shown in Table
1, uniformly. |Γi| stands for the number of tasks that ui can
execute and takes values from the interval [5, 10] uniformly.
We choose |Γi| tasks for ui uniformly from the task set T .
In setting I, we fix the PPL , the number of PUs n and
Table 1: Simulation settings
Setting αj δj c
s
i , c
p
i |Γi|  n k
I [1, 2] [0.1, 0.2] [1, 2] [5, 10] 1 100 10
II [1, 2] [0.1, 0.2] [1, 2] [5, 10] 1 [100, 200] 10
III [1, 2] [0.1, 0.2] [1, 2] [5, 10] [0.5, 2] 100 10
the number of tasks k and show the advantage of the pro-
posed on-line LPRC auction. In setting II, we fix  and k,
and demonstrate the impact of the number of PUs on FC’s
average total payment. In setting III, we fix n and k, and
illustrate the impact of PUs’ PPL  on FC’s average total
payment.
6.2 Simulation Results
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Figure 3 shows the remaining number of PUs at each time
slot in setting I. In this simulation, we assume that a PU
would drop out of the system if she was not selected for 20
consecutive time slots. Since in this situation, PUs in the
compulsory LPRC auction will not leave the system, we only
compare the on-line LPRC auction with the static auction in
this simulation. We observe that, in the on-line LPRC auc-
tion, the number of PUs remains almost unchanged. How-
ever, the remaining number of PUs drops dramatically after
20 time slots in the static auction. After 100 time slots, less
than half of PUs still stay in the system. The simulation
result shows that the proposed on-line LPRC auction can
efficiently maintain the long-term participation of PUs.
In Figure 4, we compare the cumulative total payment of
the on-line LPRC auction with the compulsory LPRC auc-
tion at each time slot in setting I. Figure 4 shows that the
proposed on-line LPRC auction can efficiently reduce FC’s
cumulative total payment. The reason is that, the proposed
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Figure 5: Number of PUs Vs. average total payment of FC.
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Figure 6: PUs’ PPLs  Vs. average total payment of FC.
on-line LPRC auction has jointly optimized FC’s payment
and PUs’ long-term participation requirement, whereas the
compulsory LPRC auction strictly guarantees PUs’ long-
term participation requirements and ignores the optimality
of FC’s payment.
Figure 5 shows the impact of the number of PUs on FC’s
average total payment in setting II. We observe that, the
average total payment increases when the number of PUs
increases. Because more PUs means more virtual sensing
request queues to stabilize, affecting the optimality of FC’s
average total payment.
In Figure 6, we show the impact of PUs’ PPL  on FC’s
average total payment in setting III. Figure 6 shows that
when  is small, the average total payment decreases when 
increases. Since larger  means higher data quality, FC can
recruit less PUs to execute each task, leading to the decrease
of the average total payment. However, when  continues to
increase, PUs’ privacy loss increases dramatically, resulting
in the increase of the payment to a single PU. As a result,
the average total payment increases. The simulation result
demonstrates that, there exists an optimal  to minimize
FC’s average total payment, FC can determine the optimal
 with numerical calculation as this simulation.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed a long-term privacy-preserving
incentive mechanism LEPA for real-time data aggregation.
LEPA takes both long-term participation constraints and
PUs’ privacy into consideration, which are essential to in-
centivize participation in real-time data aggregation. Due
to PUs’ strategic behavior and combinatorial nature of the
tasks, we proposed a computationally efficient mechanism
with near-to-optimal performance to jointly optimize FC’s
payment and PUs’ participation. Furthermore, we ensure
that the proposed on-line auction satisfies other desirable
properties, including truthfulness and individual rationality.
The effectiveness of the proposed on-line auction is validated
by both theoretical analysis and extensive simulations.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. We utilize sˆj to denote the privacy-preserving ag-
gregation of task τj . Thus, the aggregation error between
privacy-preserving data and real sensing data is given by
sˆj − sj = 1|S|
∑
i:ui∈S
(di + ηi)− 1|S|
∑
i:ui∈S
di =
1
|S|
∑
i:ui∈S
ηi.
where |S| is the cardinality of winner user set S, di and ηi
are the real sensing data and noise added to di, respectively.
Recall that the variance of the Laplacian random variable
ηi ∼ Lap(0, ai) is 2a2i , i.e., D(ηi) = 2a2i . Thus, for indepen-
dent Laplacian variables, we have
D(
1
|S|
∑
i:ui∈S
ηi) =
2
|S|2
∑
i:ui∈S
a2i .
From the Chebyshev’s inequality, we derive that
P[|sˆj − sj | ≥ αj ] ≤ 2
α2j |S|2
∑
i:ui∈S
a2i .
To achieve (αj , δj)-accuracy for task τj , we should guar-
antee that
2
α2j |S|2
∑
i:ui∈S
a2i ≤ δj .
Therefore, in time slot t, substituting bi =
γ
i
into the
above formula and do some algebra, we derive Lemma 1.
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Proof. Assume (x∗, p∗) is the optimal solution to the LPRC-
OTPM problem, it is obvious that P ∗ =
∑
i∈U (p
∗
i − qiγ ).
Further, since the proposed mechanism is truthful and indi-
vidual rational, we have p∗ ≥ csi + cpi .
Notice that the constraints of the LPRC-OTPM problem
and the LPRC-OTCM problem are the same, (x∗, p∗) is also
feasible to the LPRC-OTCM problem. Thus
M∗ ≤
∑
i∈U
(csi + c
p
i −
qi
γ
+m)x∗i
≤
∑
i∈U
(p∗i − qi
γ
+m)x∗i
= P ∗ +
∑
i∈U
mx∗i ≤ P ∗ +mn
which concludes the proof.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Proof. Notice that∑
i∈S
(csi + c
p
i −
qi
γ
+m) ≥ |S|min
i∈U
{csi + cpi −
qi
γ
+m}
From Algorithm 3, we know that for every ui, there exists
an uki such that
pi = (b
s
ki + b
p
ki
− qki
γ
)
∑
j:τj∈Γi
min{r′j , 1}∑
j:τj∈Γki
min{r′j , 1}
+
qi
γ
Therefore, we have
∑
i∈S
pi − qi
γ
=(bski + b
p
ki
− qki
γ
)
∑
j:τj∈Γi
min{r′j , 1}∑
j:τj∈Γki
min{r′j , 1}
≤d|S|max
i∈U
(bski + b
p
ki
− qki
γ
)
≤d
max
i∈U
(bski + b
p
ki
− qki
γ
)
min
i∈U
(bski + b
p
ki
− qki
γ
+m)
∑
i∈S
(csi + c
p
i −
qi
γ
+m)
=dδ
∑
i∈S
(csi + c
p
i −
qi
γ
+m)
≤2θδdHdM∗
≤2θδdHd(P ∗ +mn)
which concludes the proof.
